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decided that it removed the purpose of a delay of payment and the due 
date arrived at the latest when the ready-mixed concrete section was 
closed from the viewpoint of the purpose of a delay of wage payment. It is 
due to the interpretation of an agreement based on the concrete facts.
6.　International Law and Organizations
Claims for revocations and rescissions of administrative 
determinations and requests of special permissions to stay in 
Japan and rescission of issuing written deportation order 
The Nagoya District Court, April 18, 2019, 
Case no. （gyo u） 104 of 2019
Summary:
 This is a case concerning administrative determinations on the 
Immigration Control of an Iranian and Columbian Family （the “Plaintiffs”）. 
The Plaintiffs A and B have their first son, who has both Iranian and 
Columbian nationality （Plaintiff C）, their first daughter （Plaintiff D） and 
second son （Plaintiff E）, who have Iranian nationality. An Immigration 
Inspector （the “Immigration Inspector”） and Supervising Immigration 
Inspector of the Nagoya Regional Immigration Bureau （the “Supervising 
Immigration Inspector”） considered them as illegal stayers under Art.24 
（iv） （b）, （vii） of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. 
The plaintiff raised objections, however, and the Director of the Nagoya 
Regional Immigration Bureau （the “Director”） made administrative 
determinations, and the Supervising Immigration Inspector issued the 
written deportation orders to the Plaintiffs. These orders were issued to 
the Plaintiffs A, B, C in 2004, to the Plaintiff D in 2010, and the Plaintiff E in 
2017. On August 6, 2004, the Plaintiffs A, B, C filed actions for revocations 
of the administration determinations and declarations of nullity of the 
written deportation orders. However, the Nagoya District Court （the 
“Court”） and the Nagoya High Court rejected their requests, and the 
Justices of the Supreme Court also did not accept their requests in 2006. 
Consequently, the Plaintiffs filed actions to the Justices of the Supreme 
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Court to the Court to request for revocations and rescissions of the 
administrative determinations, and other requests.
 In rendering its judgement, the Court ruled as follows;
 Since the plasticity and flexibility of Plaintiff C in connection with living 
conditions has waned considerably, and Plaintiff C was 18 years old, 
Plaintiff C could live independently from the parents. Therefore, the Court 
concluded that the administrative determination was revoked and the 
request of special permissions to stay in Japan was upheld. As for the 
Plaintiffs A, B, D and E, the Court dismissed requests of special permissions 
to stay in Japan as unlawful, and rejected the remaining requests as there 
was no ground.
References:
Art.3, 7 & 37-2（1） of the Administrative Case Litigation Act
Art.22 of the Constitution of Japan
Art. 1&9 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child
Art.21, 22, 24, 49, 50, 54, 61 & 70 of the Immigration Control and Refugee 
Recognition Act 
Art.61 &64 of the Code of Civil Procedure
Facts:
 Plaintiff A was born in Iran and is an Iranian. Plaintiff B was born in 
Columbia and is a Columbian. Plaintiffs A and B registered a notification of 
marriage in 2001 at the Embassy of Colombia in Tokyo and the Embassy 
of Iran in Japan. Plaintiff B acquired Iranian nationality by registering the 
notification. Plaintiff A immigrated to Japan in 1991, and Plaintiff B in 1997, 
with authorized verifications for landing recognizing a status of residence 
and a period of stay as “Temporary Visitor” and “90 days.” They then 
illegally stayed in Japan over the period of stay without obtaining an 
extension or change. Plaintiff C illegally stayed in Japan over 60 days from 
his birth without permission specified in Article 22-2 （iii） or （iv） of the 
Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act. Plaintiffs D and E filed 
applications for permission to acquire the status of residence, which was 
rejected. Accordingly, Plaintiffs D and E continued staying illegally in 
Japan over 60 days from their birth. The Immigration Inspector decided 
that the Plaintiffs were recognized as illegal stayers under Art.24 （iv） （b） 
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of the Immigration Control and Refugee Recognition Act, and the Plaintiffs 
did not fall within as foreign nationals following written deportation orders. 
The Supervising Immigration Inspector notified Plaintiff A that there was 
no error in the investigation. Plaintiff A made objections pursuant to the 
provision of Article 49 （1） to the Minister of Justice （the “MOJ”）. The 
Director delegated the authority by the MOJ issued administrative 
determinations as there were no grounds. The Supervising Immigration 
Inspector notified the Plaintiffs of the administrative determinations, and 
issued the written deportation orders to Iran as the destination for 
Plaintiffs A, C, D, and E, and to Columbia for Plaintiff B.
 On August 6, 2004, Plaintiffs A, B, and C filed actions for a claim for 
revocations and rescissions of the administrative determinations and 
requests of special permissions to stay in Japan and rescission of issuing a 
written deportation order to the Court. On 2005. In 2005, Plaintiffs A, B, 
and C filed actions for a claim as they were dismissed, and the requests 
were dismissed in 2006. On November 8, 2017, Plaintiffs A, B, and C filed 
an action to the Nagoya High Court, and the action was dismissed as 
inadmissible. Consequently, the Plaintiffs filed an action in this case.
Opinions:
1. The Lawfulness of the Plaintiffs’ mandamus actions
 The Court took into account if there was any serious damage caused 
when a certain original administrative determination was not made 
following Article 3, paragraph （6）, item （i） of the Administrative Case 
Litigation Act. As to the existence of serious damage, the Court needed to 
consider if there was a substantial change in conditions, in which a 
decision of special permissions to stay in Japan was to be reviewed. The 
Court decided, as for Plaintiffs C and D, that there was a relationship 
between Plaintiffs C and D and Japan and a necessity of staying in Japan of 
Plaintiffs A and B, who had the duty of the custody of a child. Considering 
all of the above, the Court concluded that there were substantial changes 
for Plaintiffs A, B, C, and D.
2. The evaluation of taking accounting the Plaintiffs’ requests 
 A state has the discretion of accepting of foreign nationals, and the 
Immigration Control needs political judgment at a high level in some 
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cases. If the decisions of special permissions to stay in Japan were to be 
reviewed based on Art.50 （1） of the Immigration Control and Refugee 
Recognition Act they would be dealt with on the substantially extensive 
discretion of the MOJ or the director of a regional immigration bureau. If 
the administrative decisions are revoked the matter is dealt with by its 
nature by a more substantially extensive discretion. Accordingly, the Court 
considered if the first administrative determinations were beyond the 
bounds of the agency’s discretionary power or through an abuse of such 
power. Then the Court judged if a substantial change in conditions meant 
that the first administrative determinations were to be reviewed. The 
Court, firstly considered the Plaintiffs’ claim regarding the best interests of 
the child based on Art.9 of the Convention on the Rights of the Child. The 
plaintiffs claimed there are substantial changes in light of the best interests 
of the child. The Court found that the provision under the Convention on 
the Rights of the Child premises on the principle of international law that a 
state freely decides the method of accepting foreign nationals. This means, 
the MOJ and others have the discretion of decisions.
 Building on this reasoning, the Court found that it is difficult for the 
plaintiff D, who was 12 years old, to live independently from the Plaintiffs A 
and B in Japan. Therefore, there is the necessity for staying in Japan, for 
both or either of the Plaintiffs A and B if the Plaintiff D stays in Japan. 
However, the Court indicated that Plaintiffs A and B had chosen to fail to 
comply with the regulation and continued their state of illegally staying in 
Japan, and then found that permitting the Plaintiffs A and B to stay in 
Japan impairs the administrative propriety of the Immigration Control. As 
for Plaintiff C, the Court considered that he was 18 years old at the time of 
the conclusion of oral arguments, therefore the plasticity and flexibility of 
the Plaintiff C in connection with living conditions considerably would 
suffer if he was deported to Iran; learning and developing a language, and 
environmental changes in culture, society, and education. Additionally, the 
Court also considered that Plaintiff C was old enough to stay in Japan 
independently from his parents, and there is no necessity of permitting 
Plaintiffs A and B to stay in Japan. This means there was no impairment of 
the administrative propriety of Immigration Control. As for Plaintiff E, the 
Court relied on the fact he was 5 years old when the first administrative 
determination was issued, and he had the plasticity and flexibility in 
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connection with living conditions. The Court found that there was no 
serious consequence by sending back with Plaintiffs A and B based on the 
fact.
3. Decisions on the Plaintiffs’ requests
 Since there are reasonable grounds for the request regarding Plaintiff 
C, the Court revokes the administrative determination and upholds the 
request of special permission to stay in Japan under Art.7 of the 
Administrative Case Litigation Act, Art.61 and 64 of the Code of Civil 
Procedure. As for Plaintiffs A, B, D and E, the Court dismisses the 
requests for special permissions to stay in Japan as unlawful, and rejected 
the remaining requests as there was no ground.
Editorial Note:
 The case summarized above takes into account evaluating if the denial 
of the revocation regarding the special permission is beyond the bounds of 
the agency’s discretionary power or through an abuse of such power. In 
this evaluation, the Court considered the substantial changes in the 
Plaintiffs’ circumstances. There is the necessity of ensuring the interest of 
the Plaintiffs resulting from the relationship between the Plaintiff and 
Japan. As to the necessity, the Court found that the circumstances of the 
Plaintiffs C and D have the substantial changes. However, different from 
the circumstance of Plaintiff C, the Court found that there is the necessity 
of custody in the circumstance of Plaintiff D, concluded that the judgement 
of the special permission is not to be revoked by the difficulty of custody of 
Plaintiff D by Plaintiff C and the admissibility of staying in Japan by 
Plaintiffs A and B. As to the consideration by the Court, there are two 
points as follows;
1. The relationship between the free discretion of the state under 
Customary International Law and the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child.
 The Court considers that Art.9 （4） of the Convention on the Rights of 
the Child does not strictly restrict the free discretion of the state on the 
acceptance of foreign nationals, and the provision premised on the 
separation from parents may occur by the deportation. Following this 
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point , the Court , fur thermore , conc ludes that the scope o f the 
consideration under the Convention on the Rights of the Child falls within 
the domestic legal framework.
 In the reasoning summarized above, Art.9 of the Convention does not 
preclude the separation from parents. It is true that the General Comment 
No.14 （2003） of the Committee on the Rights of the Child notes that 
assessing and determining the best interests of the child may result in the 
separation （Art.9, 18 and 20）. However, it also notes “that a child shall not 
be separated from his or her parents against their will, except when ［…］ 
such separation is necessary for the best interests of the child”, because 
“Preventing family separation and preserving family unity are important 
components of the child protection system, and are based on the right 
provided for in article 9, paragraph 1” （UN. Doc., C/C/GC/14, para.60）. 
 Building on the reference to the best interests by the Committee, the 
provision assumes a case of separation by deportation rather than a case of 
child abuse or neglect. Since Japan ratified the Convention in 1994, the 
understanding of the provision shall be followed by the judgement of the 
national court. However, according to the Concluding Observations of the 
Committee （1998）, with regards to the situation in Japan, the Committee 
“notes with concern that although the Convention on the Rights of the 
Child has precedence over domestic legislation and can be invoked before 
domestic courts, in practice courts in their rulings usually do not directly 
apply international human rights treaties in general and the Convention on 
the Rights of the Chi ld in part icular .” （para.7）. In regard to the 
interpretation of Art.9 （1）, Japan also proclaimed that the government did 
not exclude a case that leads to the separation from parents as a result of 
the deportat ion based on the Immigrat ion Control and Refugee 
Recognition Act. In our view, the interpretation has the actual effect as well 
as the reservation of the Convention, so it is questionable that the natural 
court sufficiently applies the provision in practice. 
2. Assessing and determining the best interests of the child
 The Court took into account the relationship between the Plaintiffs and 
Japan, the necessity of custody of the child, and the liability of the state of 
illegally staying to Plaintiffs A and B, not family unity as the condition of 
the best interests under Art.9. The Court considered if the interpretation of 
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the best in terests o f a chi ld by the Court is consis tent wi th the 
interpretation under the Convention. According to the question of the 
concluding observation by the Committee （1998）, with respect to a case 
assumed under Art.9 （1）, Japan answered that the provision did not 
exclude the separation by the measure permitted under Art.9 （4）, such as 
the detention, imprisonment, exile, deportation or death. Then Japan also 
considered that the provision did not oblige a state party to ensure 
separating from parents only in a particular case, such as abuse or neglect 
of the child by the parents, living separately by the parents.
 However, General Comment No.14 （2003） noted “Given the gravity of 
the impact on the child of separation from his or her parents, such 
separation should only occur as a last resort measure, as when the child is 
in danger of experiencing imminent harm or when otherwise necessary; 
separation should not take place if less intrusive measures could protect 
the child.”
 In this case, the Court considered that the circumstance of Plaintiff C 
was not rare in l ight of his age at the time （18 years old） since in 
International Society a minor may live independently in a foreign country 
on various grounds. However, as mentioned above, a state party shall 
determine such separation as a last resort measure because of the gravity 
of its impact, and the Convention places a great importance on family 
unity. Therefore, it is questionable that, in assessing and determining the 
best interests of the child, the Court considered the administrative 
propriety of the Immigration Control in a state as the condition of greatest 
importance rather than family unity.
 Considering all the above, in this case, this judgement by the Court is 
not sufficiently in line with its understanding under international law.
